Islamophobia in China

A ChinaFile Conversation

Roughly 20 million Muslims live in China today; many of them live in the northwest region of Xinjiang, where the government is incarcerating an estimated one million Uighur Muslims. In recent weeks, news reports have emerged of the razing of mosques and other religious buildings across the region. In March, when 50 people were massacred at two mosques in New Zealand, many Chinese people voiced support for the shooter—in the words of one commentator—for his “heroic revenge.” What are the roots of popular fear of Islam in China today, and how is it connected to the actions of the Chinese government in Xinjiang?

‘One Seed Can Make an Impact’: An Interview with Chen Hongguo

Chen Hongguo might be China’s most famous ex-professor. Five years ago, he quit his job at the Northwest University of Politics and Law in Xi’an, publishing his resignation letter online after administrators prohibited him from inviting free-thinking lecturers to speak to his students. After resigning, he decided to keep bringing edgy speakers to this inland metropolis by launching Zhiwuzhi in 2015, a reading room whose name is the Chinese translation of the Socratic paradox “I know that I know nothing.”

Combatting Desertification in Inner Mongolia, Talking with the Federation of Trade Unions in Xinjiang

Ministry of Public Security WeChat Posts—April 17, 2019

Opening ceremonies for the “2019 International Youth Prevention of Desertification Project” took place in Dalad banner in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region’s Erdos city. The event was co-sponsored by the Korean-Chinese Culture Youth Association (Future Forest) and the Dalad Banner Chinese Communist Youth League Committee, and was filed as a temporary activity in accordance with the law. Former U.N. Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, President of the Korean-Chinese Culture Youth Association Quan Bingxuan, Deputy Secretary of the Communist Youth League Beijing Committee Shen Xue, and the Secretary of Dalad banner attended the ceremony, among others. After the ceremony finished, Korean volunteers, students, and teachers from Beijing Resources College, along with local volunteers, took part in a tree-planting activity in the Kubuqi desert. The event aimed to inspire young people to take an active role in the prevention of desertification. During the activity, Chinese and Korean youth engaged in friendly and honest exchange, forming close ties with each other.

The Costs of Conversation

Cornell University Press: After a war breaks out, what factors influence the warring parties’ decisions about whether to talk to their enemy, and when may their position on wartime diplomacy change? How do we get from only fighting to also talking?

In The Costs of Conversation, Oriana Skylar Mastro argues that states are primarily concerned with the strategic costs of conversation, and these costs need to be low before combatants are willing to engage in direct talks with their enemy. Specifically, Mastro writes, leaders look to two factors when determining the probable strategic costs of demonstrating a willingness to talk: the likelihood the enemy will interpret openness to diplomacy as a sign of weakness, and how the enemy may change its strategy in response to such an interpretation. Only if a state thinks it has demonstrated adequate strength and resiliency to avoid the inference of weakness, and believes that its enemy has limited capacity to escalate or intensify the war, will it be open to talking with the enemy.

Through four primary case studies—North Vietnamese diplomatic decisions during the Vietnam War, those of China in the Korean War and Sino-Indian War, and Indian diplomatic decision making in the latter conflict—The Costs of Conversation demonstrates that the costly conversations thesis best explains the timing and nature of countries’ approach to wartime talks, and therefore when peace talks begin. As a result, Mastro’s findings have significant theoretical and practical implications for war duration and termination, as well as for military strategy, diplomacy, and mediation.

Is the Belt and Road Initiative a Bold Economic Agenda or a Political Ploy?

A China in Africa Podcast

In an ongoing series that explores different interpretations of what exactly is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Eric and Cobus are joined by Zhu Zheng, an international affairs columnist for Caixin and a research fellow at the China-Eastern Europe Institute. Zhu has traveled extensively across Belt and Road countries in Asia, the Americas, and Eastern Europe, where he is currently conducting a six-month field study.

China: A Small Bit of Shelter

At night, a spotlight illuminates four huge characters on the front of the Great Temple of Promoting Goodness in Xi’an, the capital of Shaanxi province in northwestern China: mi zang zong feng, “The Esoteric Repository of the Faith’s Traditions.” Twelve centuries ago, during China’s Tang dynasty, the temple was a center for spreading foreign ideas. Buddhist missionaries from India lived there, translating texts from Sanskrit into Chinese and advising emperors on their faith’s new ideas about life and society. Today, the temple is a tourist site. During the day visitors snap selfies and pray for good fortune; in the evening, it is dark except for the spot-lit characters. Across the street, though, the third-floor windows of a nondescript commercial building burn brightly, lighting up a sign with five English words: “I Know I Know Nothing.”

This Year, I Couldn’t Avoid May Fourth

The one hundredth anniversary of the 1919 May Fourth Movement came and went last week much as one would have expected...For some, myself included, the anniversary evoked a set of more complicated emotions. For years, these complications have pushed me to mentally dance around the movement’s significance: On most May Fourth anniversaries, I have pointedly ignored the historical discussion bubbling up around me. Instead, I wished my friends “Happy Star Wars Day” (“May the Fourth be with you!”). Serious discussion of May Fourth tended to put me at odds with friends on both ends of the Chinese ideological spectrum.

Xu Song

Xu Song is a senior photo editor at Tencent News.

In 2017, he launched a photography education program for left-behind children in mountainous areas of northern Shanxi province and southwestern Yunnan province. As the organizer as well as a teacher, he uses photography as an entry point to encourage children to express themselves. In December 2018, Xu Song curated an exhibition in Beijing of photography from his students.

Xu’s series “Summer Swimming Pools” was photographed in 2014, 2015, and 2016, and his series “White Shirts” was photographed in 2017 and 2018.

Xu graduated from Communication University of China.

Zheng Zhu

Zheng Zhu is an independent analyst who focuses on risk analysis, emerging markets, and Chinese outbound investment. He provides in-depth analysis for Chinese investors on international stock markets, real estate and political economy for countries along the Belt and Road Initiative. Zhu is also a columnist on international affairs for the Chinese financial newspaper Caixin and he is also a research fellow at the China-CEE Institute, the first Chinese think tank that is independently registered in Europe. He has been to more than 40 countries and is now doing a six-month field study on Chinese investments in Europe from Serbia to Belarus.

May Fourth’s Unfulfilled Promise

Spring 2019 is marked by a series of sensitive anniversaries for China: Beijing is visibly nervous that the 30th anniversary of the June 4 Tiananmen massacre could trigger protests. But it is also concerned about the 100th anniversary of the lesser known May 4 movement, which inspired the 1989 protests and called for greater participation and more transparency in political affairs. Like in 1989, in 1919 it was mainly students who took to the streets—but as the protests continued, journalists, teachers, writers, and intellectuals joined them. They shouted slogans, chanted songs, and held banners, demonstrating against imperialism and for the Chinese right of self-determination. They also demanded freedom, equality, democracy, and education. It was the first purely political public demonstration in Chinese history. And of the two demands of the students—nationalism and democracy—one remains sorely unmet.