Since the end of World War II, the United States has developed a characteristic approach to protecting its interests in Asia. In peace and in war, the U.S. position in Asia has rested on a set of alliances, ground and air forces deployed on allied and U.S. territory, nuclear-strike forces, and carrier-strike groups operating in the Western Pacific. But China has been working systematically to undermine the American approach to assurance, deterrence, and warfighting. Specifically, China’s military modernization, if it continues apace, may allow it to decouple America’s allies from the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, to destroy U.S. and allied fixed bases in the region, and to threaten U.S. power projection forces. This, in turn, could allow China to coerce U.S. allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, hold U.S. forces at arm’s length, and control the seas along the Asian periphery. This paper sets out three fundamental strategic alternatives the U.S. faces as it seeks to match its ends and its means in an increasingly turbulent environment.