The Chinese are eager to fill the void that Washington is leaving around the world on everything from setting the rules of trade and environmental standards to financing infrastructure projects.
Philippe Le Corre is a Senior Fellow with the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis and a Senior Fellow with the Harvard Kennedy School’s Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, specializing in China’s geoeconomic and geopolitical rise, China-EU relations, and Chinese foreign direct investment. He is also a Visiting Professor at ESSEC Business School in Paris, a Senior Research Fellow with the ESSEC Institute for Research and Education in Negotiation, and an Affiliate with the French Institute for East Asia (IFRAE-CNRS). He was previously a fellow with the Brookings Institution in Washington and has testified several times before the U.S. Congress. He has worked on China since the late 1980s first as a foreign correspondent for Radio France International, then as a senior adviser to the French Minister of Defense, a consultant, and a think-tanker. He is the author or co-author of several books on China, including China’s Offensive in Europe (Brookings Institution Press, 2016), and has contributed chapters to edited volumes such as “Does the Rise of China Threaten the Transatlantic Partnership?” in The China Questions 2 (Harvard University Press, 2022), “European and American Approaches Towards Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Post-COVID Times: Opportunities, challenges and policy responses” in Europe in an era of Growing Sino-American Competition (Routledge, 2021), and China-US-Europe Relations in a New Era (Routledge, 2020). He has also contributed to publications such as The Wall Street Journal, The Financial Times, National Interest, Le Monde, Les Echos, Nikkei Asia, China Perspectives, and Asia-Europe Journal. He is the co-author of the 2021 Carnegie report “China’s Influence in Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries.”
Welfare, Work, and Poverty provides the first systematic and comprehensive evaluation of the impacts and effectiveness of China’s primary social assistance program—the “dibao,” or “Minimum Livelihood Guarantee”—since its inception in 1993. The dibao serves the dual function of providing a basic safety net for the poor and maintaining social and political stability. Despite currently being the world’s largest welfare program in terms of population coverage, evidence on the dibao’s performance has been lacking. This book offers important new empirical evidence and draws policy lessons that are timely and useful for both China and beyond. Specifically, author Qin Gao addresses the following questions:
Answers to these questions not only help us gain an in-depth understanding of the dibao’s performance, but also add the Chinese case to the growing international literature on comparative welfare studies. Welfare, Work, and Poverty is essential reading for political scientists, economists, sociologists, public policy researchers, and social workers interested in learning about and understanding contemporary China. —Oxford University Press
“Welfare, Work, and Poverty: How Effective is Social Assistance in China?,” by Qin Gao, China Policy Institute: Analysis
Su Lin Han is a Senior Fellow at the Paul Tsai China Center, and a Senior Research Scholar in Law and Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School. A native of Beijing who has lived in the United States since graduating college, Han has extensive experience and expertise in numerous aspects of Chinese and American law. After receiving a J.D. from the Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, she worked as a corporate attorney at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering in Washington, D.C. and the Hong Kong office of Cravath, Swaine & Moore. Prior to joining the Paul Tsai China Center, she worked as a legal consultant to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank on a variety of legal and financial reform projects in China. Her portfolio at the Center includes women’s rights and domestic violence, consumer protection regulation, and public interest litigation in China.
From May 31 to June 2, Premier Li Keqiang will visit Germany and Belgium, to “further deepen and enrich China’s relations with the European Union (EU) at a time of increasing global uncertainty,” according to an article in China’s state newswire Xinhua. Li’s trip comes four days after Donald Trump’s trip to Europe, where he criticized German trade policies; declined to reaffirm American commitment to Article V of the NATO treaty, which states ally states must aid other ally states in the event of an attack; and seemed to shove aside the Montenegrin Prime Minister in the lead-up to a photo. What is the state of Sino-European relations in the Trump era? And is Beijing actively trying to capitalize on growing tensions between Europe and the United States? Will China outshine the U.S. in relations with Europe?
Beijing is in prime position to capitalize on major policy fissures that have emerged between Europe and the Trump administration on climate, trade and defense. The new dynamic will be on full display on Thursday in Brussels, when Chinese Premier Li Keqiang meets with EU counterparts at the annual EU-China Summit. Hours later, President Trump is expected to announce the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris climate agreement.
China put out a policy paper today on human rights in the Muslim-heavy Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where the Chinese government has been cracking down extensively in recent years.
The daughter of two Canadian winery owners being held by Chinese authorities over an alleged customs valuation dispute says the case should serve as a warning for other Canadians hoping to do business in China.
China’s state-owned media on Thursday criticized reports new THAAD anti-missile launchers were secretly brought into South Korea without approval from the Seoul government.
China’s state-owned media on Thursday criticized reports new THAAD anti-missile launchers were secretly brought into South Korea without approval from the Seoul government.
